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BROADCOM CORP.V. QUALCOMM INC.
543 F.3D 683 (FED. CIR. 2008)
I .INTRODUCTION
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., Broadcom Corp.
("Broadcom") brought an infringement suit in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California against its
competitor Qualcomm Inc. ("Qualcomm").I In the suit, Broadcom
alleged that Qualcomm's CDMA2000 and WCDMA baseband
chips infringed U.S. Patents No. 6,847,686 ("the '686 patent"),
No. 5,657,317 ("the '317 patent"), and No. 6,389,010 ("the '010
2patent"), all owned by Broadcom. At trial, the jury determined
that Qualcomm infringed all three Broadcom patents and awarded
damages of approximately $20 million.3 Thereafter, the district
court issued a permanent injunction against Qualcomm; however,
the injunction included a "sunset" provision allowing Qualcomm
to continue selling the infringing products pursuant to mandatory
royalties through January 31, 2009. 4
Qualcomm appealed the infringement verdict and the district
court's issuance of a permanent injunction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("The Federal Circuit").5
The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's infringement verdicts as to
the '317 and '010 patents, reversed the jury's infringement verdict
as to the '686 patent by holding claim 3 of that patent invalid, and
affirmed the district court's permanent injunction order. 6 The
Federal Circuit then remanded the case back to the district court
for a re-calculation of damages based upon the modified jury ver-
dicts.7
'Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 686 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
21d.
3Id. at 687.
4Id.
5Id. at 686.6/,d.
7Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 704.
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IL BACKGROUND
Broadcom and Qualcomm are competitors in the market for
third-generation ("3G") baseband processor chips, which enable a
cell phone's wireless voice and data communications on various
cellular telephone networks.8 The 3G chips sold by Broadcom and
Qualcomm include code division multiple access ("CDMA")
chips, known as CDMA2000 chips, and global system for mobile
communications ("GSM") chips, known as wideband CDMA
chips. 9 In general, the CDMA and GSM technologies are incom-
patible with one another; as a result, cell phones and cellular ser-
vice networks are designed to work with only one of the compet-
ing chips.' 0 Broadcom asserted that Qualcomm's CDMA2000 and
WCDMA chips, as well as Qualcomm's Qchat technology, which
provides push-to-talk ("PTT") features, infringed upon Broad-
com's '686, '317, and '010 patents.' 1
Prior to trial, the district court held a Markman hearing, at which
time the court addressed contested issues between the parties per-
taining to claim construction of the Broadcom patents.12 After the
trial, the jury found that Qualcomm (1) directly infringed and in-
duced infringement of claim 3 of the '686 patent, (2) directly in-
fringed and induced infringement of claims 1, 6, 9, and 12 of the
'317 patent, and (3) directly infringed, induced infringement of,
and contributed to the infringement of claims 1, 2, 3, and 7 of the
'010 patent.' 3 In addition, the jury determined that Qualcomm
wilfully infringed all three patents and subsequently awarded
Broadcom damages of approximately $20 million. 14 Following
the trial, Qualcomm's motion for judgment as a matter of law and
its motion for a new trial were denied. 15 Accordingly, a perma-
8Id. at 686.
91d.
101d.
"Id.
12 d at 687. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, the Federal Circuit held that
claim construction is a matter of law to be decided by the judge. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Thus, at a Markman hearing,
the court determines the proper claim construction of disputed patent claims.
Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 687.
13Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 687.
151d.
204
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nent injunction was entered by the district court against Qualcomm
on all three patents, but the injunction contained a "sunset" provi-
sion allowing Qualcomm to continue selling its infringing products
purusant to royalty payments through January 2009.16
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Qualcomm appealed to the Federal Circuit contending that the
jury's infringement verdicts should be struck down, the district
court's permanent injunction lifted, and a new trial granted on the
grounds that the district court committed numerous errors regard-
ing the claim construction and the validity of Broadcom's '686,
'317, and '010 patents. '7
A. Broadcom's '686 Patent
Broadcom's '686 patent generally pertains to video compression
technology on cell phone devices. 18 Here, Broadcom asserted that
Qualcomm's CDMA2000 and WCDMA baseband processor chips
infringed claim 3 of this patent. 19 Claim 3 depends from inde-
pendent claim 1, which recites "a digital signal processor for proc-
essing a multiple frame video digital signal" having a digital signal
processor controller ("DSP"), processing units connected to and
controlled by the DSP controller, and storage units, all residing on
a single chip. 20 In addition, claim 3 contains the following limita-
tion: "the digital signal processor according to claim 1 wherein
each of said processing units operates according to a different pro-
gram command.",21 At the Markman hearing for determining the
legal construction of the patent claims, the district court held that
the digital signal processor disclosed in claim 3 required a global
controller in order to effectively distribute control instructions to
each of the processing units.22 This is important because it was
16Id.
1Id. at 688.
'1Id. at 686.
19Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 686-87.20Id at 688.
2 id.
22 d. The district court construed the claim as follows: "[t]he DSP controller,
either independently or under the direction of a global controller, distributes
205
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undisputed that a Texas Instruments product already on the market
anticipated, and would therefore invalidate, claim 3 if this claim
did NOT contain a "global controller" limitation.23 Thus, because
the district court construed claim 3 to contain this limitation, the
jury found that Qualcomm's CDMA2000 and WCDMA baseband
processor chips directly infringed and induced infringement of
claim 3 of the '686 patent.24
Here, Qualcomm contended that the district court inappropri-
ately imported the "global controller" limitation into the '686 pat-
ent, and it thus argued that the '686 patent was anticipated and
therefore invalid.25 Instead, Qualcomm noted that the language of
both claims 1 and 3 was directed only to digital signal processors,
which was supported by the fact that the specification and figures
of the patent specifically distinguish between digital service proc-
essors and global controllers.26 In response, Broadcom asserted
that the district court appropriately interpreted the claims in light
of the specification, which indicated that "the global controller...
controls and schedules ... the digital signal processor."
27
The Federal Circuit agreed with Qualcomm and held that the
district court's interpretation of claim 3 was improper. 2 ' As a
baseline, the Federal Circuit cited the claim construction maxim
"when the claim addresses only some of the features disclosed in
the specification, it is improper to limit the claim to other, un-
claimed features., 29 Therefore, even though the specification and
the drawings of the '686 patent referred to the usage of a "global
controller" in some embodiments, claim 1 (and claim 3 dependent
thereon) was specifically directed to a digital signal processor con-
troller, processing units, at a storage unit, and the claim made no
explicit references to an external global controller.30 In addition,
the court found it significant that Figures 3, 4, and 7 identified the
control instructions to be executed by the plurality of processing units. A global
controller is required." Id.23Id
"
1
4M. at 687.
25Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 688.
26 d.
.at 689.
28Id
"
291d. (quoting Ventana Med. Sys. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).30 d.
206
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global controller as a discrete and separate component apart from
the digital signal processor.31 The Federal Circuit also analyzed
U.S. Patent No. 6,385,244 ("the '244 patent"), which as the parent
of the '686 patent, contained the same specification.32 The court
found it noteworthy that independent claim 1 of the '244 patent
explicitly claimed a "global controller" as one of the claim limita-
tions, providing further support to the court's belief that there was
no "basis for importing the 'global controller' limitation" into
claims 1 and 3 of the '686 patent.33 As a result of this modified
interpretation, the Federal Circuit held claim 3 as invalidated by
the anticipatory reference, and thereby reversed the jury's in-
fringement verdict as to Broadcom's '686 patent.
34
B. Broadcom 's '317 Patent
Broadcom's '317 patent relates to technology allowing cell
phones to simultaneously participate on multiple wireless networks
while using a single transceiver. 35 Claim 1, which is substantially
similar to the other claims at issue, recites a "radio unit for opera-
tion in a communication system" and having a control processor
designed to enable the transceiver to simultaneously participate on
two or more RF communication networks.36 Here, Broadcom as-
serted that Qualcomm's CDMA2000 chips infringed claims 1, 6,
9, and 12 of this patent because these chips interfaced with both
the network for traditional voice communications and the network
for data and related applications. 37 At the Markman hearing for
determining the scope of the patent claims, the district court con-
strued "simultaneously participate" as "[t]aking part in communi-
cations with two or more networks either actively or in sleep-mode
during the same period of time."38 Over Qualcomm's objections,
the district court did not hold a claim construction hearing to inter-
pret the definition of "networks," and the court effectively left this
31Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 689.
32Id. at 690.
33
1d.
341d. at 690-91.
351d. at 687.
36Id. at 691.37Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 687.381d. at 691.
207
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issue to the jury.39 Based upon these claim constructions, the jury
found that Qualcomm's CDMA2000 processor chips directly in-
fringed and induced infringement of claims 1, 6, 9, and 12 of the
'317 patent.
40
1. "Simultaneously Participate"
First, Qualcomm argued that the claim limitation "simultane-
ously participate" should be interpreted to require a transceiver
that takes part in communications with two or more networks at
the same instant in time. 41 In support, Qualcomm cited that the
specification mentions both "simultaneous participation" and
"multiple participation," wherein the specification's reference to
"simultaneous participation" was within the context of communi-
cations taking place at the same instant in time.42 In response,
Broadcom asserted that the district court's findings were correct
because the specification distinguishes between "simultaneous par-
ticipation," requiring a transceiver capable of communicating with
two or more networks during the same period of time, and fully
"simultaneous participation," requiring a transceiver capable of
communicating with two or more networks at the same instant in
time.4
3
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's interpreta-
tion, reasoning that the claim limitation "simultaneous participa-
tion refers to interleaved communications., 44 Although both par-
ties argued that parts of the specification supported their
interpretation of the claim language, the court found that the usage
of simultaneous, multiple, and fully simultaneous was "inconsis-
tent at best.",45 In Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave., Inc., the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that "a [claim] construction that renders the
claimed invention inoperable should be viewed with extreme skep-
391d.
401d. at 687.41id. at 691.421d. at 692.43Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 692.
44Id. at 693.45Id. at 692.
208
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ticism. ' '46 Thus, because the specification as a whole indicated
that the invention was directed to a communication system with a
single transceiver, and because a single transceiver cannot achieve
dual, full communication with two different networks during the
same instant of time, the court determined that adopting Qual-
comm's interpretation of "simultaneous participation" would ren-
der the device, and the patent, unworkable.47 In turn, the court
agreed with the district court that the most reasonable construction
of "simultaneous participation" required a single transceiver capa-
ble of communications with multiple networks during the same pe-
riod of time.48
Qualcomm also argued that even if the Federal Circuit were to
adopt the district court's construction of "simultaneously partici-
pate," Broadcom's patent was invalid because its claims were an-
ticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,550, 895 ("the '895 patent").49 In
response, Broadcom presented evidence to the court indicating that
the '895 was not prior art because Broadcom conceived its inven-
tion and reduced it to practice before the '895 patent application
was filed.50 The Federal Circuit agreed with Broadcom that its
patent antedated the '895 reference, because Broadcom advanced
notebook evidence from a former employee (the inventor) that
demonstrated conception of the claimed invention in September
1989, and Broadcom constructively reduced the invention to prac-
tice (by filing patent applications) in May and November 1993, be-
fore the December 1993 filing date of the '895 patent. 51 Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that the '895 patent was not valid prior art,
and thereby affirmed the jury's verdict in regards to this issue. 52
2. "Networks"
Next, Qualcomm cited Supreme Court precedent to support its
461d. at 691 (quoting Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave., Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1174
(Fed. Cir. 2008), reh 'g en banc denied 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10499 (Apr. 9,
2008)).471d.
48Id. at 693.49Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 693.501d.
511d.52Id. at 694.
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proposition that the district court committed reversible error when
it left an issue of claim construction to the jury by failing to con-
strue the claim limitation "networks., 53 Further, Qualcomm con-
tended that "network" should have been construed "as a plurality
of network devices" such that Qualcomm's product, which con-
tained distinct protocols rather than separate networks, did not in-
fringe upon the Broadcom patent.54 Without addressing the merits
of Qualcomm's issue, the court dismissed this claim on the basis
that Qualcomm did not raise this argument at any time during or
prior to the trial. 55 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that Qual-
comm, by failing to request a construction of this claim limitation,
"implicitly conceded that the meanings of 'networks' [was]
clear." 56 As a result, the issue was properly left to the jury, and
the Federal Circuit upheld the jury's infringement verdict as to this
claim limitation.
57
C. Broadcom's '010 Patent
Broadcom's '010 patent relates to a telephone having circuitry
allowing it to "selectively couple" to two networks having differ-
ent bandwith characteristics. 58 Claim 1, which is similar to the
other claims at issue, recites a telephone having "an interface cir-
cuit that selectively couples to the first and second networks," with
the importance of the claim revolving around the fact that the first
and second networks are generally independent from one an-
other.5 9 Here, Broadcom claimed that Qualcomm's CDMA 2000
chips infringed claims 1, 2, 3, and 7 of this patent because these
chips, which are designed to implement the Qchat features, allow
traditional voice calls to couple to the telephone network (the first
network) while Qchat calls are routed through the intemet (the
second network).6 °
531d.
54Id.
55Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 694.561d.
7Id.
58Id. at 687.
'Id. at 694-95.60Id at 695.
210
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Before the Federal Circuit, Qualcomm argued that its products
did not infringe the '010 patent because the cell phones that em-
ploy the Qchat software did not physically "couple" to the tele-
phone network nor the internet. 6 1 Instead, Qualcomm noted that
the Qchat software wirelessly communicates with the CDMA2000
network equipment, and the CDMA2000 equipment, which is in-
dependent from the phone, is then responsible for selectively cou-
pling to either the telephone network or the internet. 62 Accord-
ingly, Qualcomm argued that its phones did not have "an interface
circuit" within the phones, as required by claim 1 of the '010 pat-
ent. Broadcom respondend by alleging that the '010 patent "does
not require a direct connection," as the specification indicates that
wireless networks may be used.63
First, the Federal Circuit noted that claim limitation "selectively
couple" was "not construed by the district court because the parties
agreed to let the ordinary meaning control. 64 Thus, as the Federal
Circuit held in Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., the
proper standard of review for this infringement action was:
"whether a reasonable jury, given the record before it was viewed
as a whole, could have arrived at the conclusion it did."65 In this
case, the Federal Circuit found it significant that one of Broad-
com's experts testified that the term "selectively coupling," as
used in the specification, would not necessarily require a direct
connection. 66 The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's infringement
verdict, finding that this testimony, coupled with the testimony
from a number of other experts, was certainly enough evidence to
support "a reasonable jury's [ultimate] conclusion" that Qual-
comm's products infringed Broadcom's '0 10 patent.
67
D. Qualcomm 's Motion for a New Trial
Qualcomm further argued that its motion for a new trial should
61Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 695.
6 21d.
631d.
64MId. at 696.
6 51d. (quoting Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
6 6
1d
67Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 696.
9
Schermerhorn: Broadcam Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. 543 F.3D 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XIX:203
be granted because (1) the district court provided the jury with in-
correct jury instructions as to the application of the specific intent
requirement necessary to show induced infringement, (2) evidence
that a party did not obtain non-infringement opinions is not rele-
vant to the specific intent requirement, and (3) the induced in-
fringement verdicts were not supported by a substantial amount of
the direct evidence. 68  Because the success of these arguments
would affect the damages awards and would tremendously com-
plicate the process, Qualcomm argued that a new trial should be
held.69
In dealing with Qualcomm's motion for a new trial, the Federal
Circuit first laid out the appropriate standard for induced infringe-
ment.7 ° "In order to prevail on an inducement claim, the patentee
must establish 'first that there has been direct infringement, and
second that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement
and possessed specific intent to encourage another's infringe-
ment."' 71 In these cases, induced infringement may be proved by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. 72 Given that the court had
previously found evidence of direct infringement, the issue came
down to whether Qualcomm possessed a specific intent to encour-, 73
age another's infringement. Here, the Federal Circuit stated,
"inducement requires evidence of culpable conduct." 74 In order to
satisfy the specific intent requirement, the Federal Circuit noted
that a court must look to the totality of the circumstances. 75 Fur-
ther, the Federal Circuit rejected Qualcomm's argument, holding
that evidence of whether or not the accused infringer sought the
advice of an attorney or obtained a non-infringement opinion was
a factor that may be considered as part of this totality of the cir-
cumstances test. 
6
As applied to the district court's jury instructions, the Federal
681d. at 697.
69 1d.
701d.
71Id. (quoting ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
'Id. at 699.
73Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 697.74 d. at 698 (quoting ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1312).
75id.
76 1d
"
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Circuit found that the instructions properly informed the jury as to
the proper overall standard for determining liability on an induced
infringement claim, and praised the district court for instructing
the jury to "consider all of the circumstances, including whether or
not Qualcomm obtained the advice of a competent lawyer."77 The
Federal Circuit also found it significant that Qualcomm failed to
suggest alternative jury instructions to the district court, and Qual-
comm did not even object to these jury instructions at trial.78 The
Federal Circuit thereby affirmed the instructions, and then turned
its attention to Qualcomm's final argument: that the jury's verdict
of induced infringement was not supported by substantial evi-
dence.79
Prior to addressing the merits of this claim, the Federal Circuit
clarified that a verdict for induced infringement may be supported
by either direct or circumstantial evidence of induced infringe-
ment. Therefore, the Federal Circuit found it appropriate for the
jury to consider circumstantial evidence that Qualcomm "worked
closely with its customers to develop and support the accused
products" or that Qualcomm chose not to change its products or
provide any infringement related instructions to its customers even
after this infringement suit was filed.81 The Federal Circuit also
noted that Qualcomm failed to present any evidence to negate the
jury's inference regarding the specific intent element.82 At trial, it
was established that Qualcomm (1) did not investigate possible in-
fringement, (2) did not explore alternative, non-infringing product
designs, and (3) did not seek legal advice. 83 Thus, the Federal Cir-
cuit found it appropriate for the jury to infer a specific intent to in-
duce infringement, and the Federal Circuit found the record rife
with substantial evidence "to support the jury's verdict."' 84 As a
result, the Federal Circuit dismissed Qualcomm's motion for a
new trial.85
77Id.
78Id. at 700.
79Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 699-700.
80ld. at 700.
821d.
831d
.
84Id.
SBroadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 701.
213
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E. Qualcomm's Objection to the Permanent Injunction
Qualcomm also argued that the district court's issuance of a
permanent injunction in favor of Broadcom did not fall squarely
within the four-factor test laid down by the Supreme Court 86 In
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court applied
traditional principles of equity to the concept of injunctive relief
within the patent world.87 Accordingly, in order for a plaintiff to
obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must show: "(1) that it
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law ... are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, con-
sidering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defen-
dant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public inter-
est would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." 88 Using
these factors, the district court issued a permanent injunction
against Qualcomm, with the exception that the injunctive relief
provided Qualcomm with a "sunset" provision allowing it to con-
tinue manufacturing and selling its products, subject to mandatory
royalties, until January 2009.89 On appeal, the Federal Circuit ex-
amined the district court's findings to address Qualcomm's argu-
ments in light of each factor, and determined that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by issuing a permanent injunction
against Qualcomm. 90
1. Did Broadcom Suffer an Irreparable Injury?
On appeal, Qualcomm argued that Broadcom would not suffer
harm as a result of Qualcomm's CDMA2000 chip sales because
Broadcom did not sell or plan to sell a comparable product. 9'
Likewise, Qualcomm argued that Broadcom would not suffer harm
as a result of Qualcomm's sales of products using the Qchat soft-
ware because Broadcom did not have a comparable product in this
861d.
87Id. at 702.88 d. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).891d. at 687.
901d. at 702.
91Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 702.
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market. 92 In response, Broadcom pointed the court to two impor-
tant considerations: (1) Qualcomm had previously admitted that it
indirectly competed with Broadcom and (2) Broadcom had a gen-
eral policy against licensing its patents, and that forcing Broadcom
to license its intellectual property to a significant competitor would
cause Broadcom significant harm.
93
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that Broadcom would suffer an ir-
reparable injury if Qualcomm were allowed to continue selling its
CMDA2000 and Qchat products. 94 In particular, the court was
persuaded by the fact that Qualcomm had previously conceded that
Broadcom and Qualcomm were indirect competitors. 95  And,
given the unique nature of the chips and handsets markets, the
Federal Circuit believed the district court was correct when it
stated, "in this kind of market, the exclusion has a competitive ef-
fect on a firm even if it does not have an immediately available
product.",96 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not think that Broadcom
was not entitled to a permanent injunction simply because it did
not have a product that directly competed with Qualcomm's prod-
ucts. 9 7 Instead, the Federal Circuit found that there was sufficient
evidence to indicate that Broadcom would suffer some sort of an
irreparable harm without a court entered permanent injunction. 98
2. Are there Adequate Remedies Available at Law?
Qualcomm asserted that there were adequate remedies available
to Broadcom in the form of money damages. 99 In support, Qual-
comm argued that the fact that Broadcom maintained an on-going
licensing agreement with Verizon indicated that Broadcom could
be adequately compensated through remedies available at law.'
00
In reply, Broadcom attempted to draw a distinction between a vol-
921d.
931d.
94 d. at 703.951d.
96M at 702.97Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 703.
981d.
99 d.
1001d.
13
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untary licensing agreement formed with a customer (in this case,
Verizon) and a compulsory licensing agreement with a competitor
(in this case, Qualcomm).10 1 Broadcom also cited the numerous
non-monetary benefits shared by both Verizon and Broadcom as a
result of their mutual licensing agreement.' 02 The Federal Circuit
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a
permanent injunction in regards to this factor, holding that the
unique nature of the market (as the district court previously found)
and the difficulty in accurately calculating damages based upon
lost profits and potential gains decreased the likelihood of the
court finding an adequate and accurate remedy at law. 10
3
3. Does the Permanent Injunction Effectively Balance the
Hardships?
In order for a permanent injunction to be seen as a proper rem-
edy, the injunction should effectively balance the anticipated hard-
ships the injunction order would have on both the plaintiffs and the
defendants. 104 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion because it properly balanced the
hardships that the injunctive order would have on both Qualcomm
and Broadcom. 10 5  Although the injunction would force Qual-
comm to cease sales of its CDMA2000 chips and other products,
the Federal Circuit found that the presence of the "sunset" provi-
sion, which the district court created to provide Qualcomm twenty
months to research and design alternative, non-infringing products,
was sufficient to ameliorate some of the negative effects of the in-
junction order upon Qualcomm. 1°6  Here, the Federal Circuit
found that this twenty-month extension would provide Qualcomm
an adequate amount of time to cease infringement of Broadcom's
patents, begin development of alternatives, and bring the product
to the market. °
10lid"1 021d.
1 03Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 703.
4Id. at 704.
1 0 5
id.
106Id.
1071d.
216
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4. Does the Permanent Injunction Serve the Public Interest?
In order for a permanent injunction to be seen as a proper rem-
edy, the injunctive order must also protect the public interest. 10 8
In this regard, the Federal Circuit balanced the general public in-
terest involved in protecting patent rights with the possible nega-
tive effects that an injunction would have upon consumers.109
Given that a permanent injunction would impact all network carri-
ers and cell phone manufacturers that use Qualcomm's infringing
products, the Federal Circuit was overly concerned with the in-
junction's potential for harming the public interest.'10 However,
the Federal Circuit found that the presence of the "sunset" provi-
sion would effectively "balance the police of protecting the pat-
entee's rights against the desireability of avoiding immediate mar-
ket disruptions.""' Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in crafting an equitable
remedy that did not significantly harm the public interest. 12
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the
district court's judgment, thereby remanding the case back to the
district court for a re-calculation of the damages awards." 3 First,
the Federal Circuit held claim 3 of the '686 patent was anticipated
by a prior art reference, and therefore, was invalid; as a result, the
Federal Circuit reversed the jury's infringement verdict against
Qualcomm as to this particular patent.1 4 Second, the Federal Cir-
cuit upheld the validity of the '317 and '010 patents, and affirmed
the jury's infringement verdict against Qualcomm as to these pat-
ents. 115 Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed Qualcomm's mo-
tion for a new trial, and affirmed the district court's issuance of a
10 8
1d.
'°
9Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 704.
I01d.
11 11d.
112 Id.
1
"
3Id. at 705.114/d. at 704.
'"Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 705.
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permanent injunction against Qualcomm. 116 Given that the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed part of the jury's infringement verdicts, the
court then remanded the case back to the district court for a re-
calculation of the damages to be awarded to Broadcom. 117
-Ryan Schermerhorn
'"Id. at 704.
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